Where is the global corporate elite? A large-scale network study of
  local and nonlocal interlocking directorates by Heemskerk, Eelke M. et al.
Where is the global corporate elite?
A large-scale network study of local and nonlocal
interlocking directorates
Eelke M. Heemskerk, Frank W. Takes,
Javier Garcia-Bernardo and M. Jouke Huijzer
{e.m.heemskerk,takes,garcia}@uva.nl
CORPNET, University of Amsterdam
http://corpnet.uva.nl
July 14, 2016
Abstract
Business elites reconfigure their locus of organization over time, from
the city level, to the national level, and beyond. We ask what the current
level of elite organization is and propose a novel theoretical and empirical
approach to answer this question. Building on the universal distinction
between local and nonlocal ties we use network analysis and community
detection to dissect the global network of interlocking directorates among
over five million firms. We find that elite orientation is indeed changing
from the national to the transnational plane, but we register a consider-
able heterogeneity across different regions in the world. In some regions
the business communities are organized along national borders, whereas in
other areas the locus of organization is at the city level or international
level. London dominates the global corporate elite network. Our findings
underscore that the study of corporate elites requires an approach that is
sensitive to levels of organization that go beyond the confines of nation states.
Keywords: corporate elite; transnational elite; corporate governance; busi-
ness networks; interlocking directorates; community detection; network anal-
ysis; network science
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1 Why we should not study transnational corporate elites
With the growing internationalization of business during the second half of the
twentieth century, critical scholars increasingly saw a development where the
elites who own and control corporations cease to be organized or divided along
national lines. Instead, they expect the formation of a ‘transnational capitalist
class’ (Burris and Staples, 2012, pp. 324). They predicted that the national
identities of corporate elites would be replaced by a common transnational identity
with a shared sense of economic interests and an enhanced capacity for unified
political action (Robinson, 2004; Sklair, 2001). Robinson, for instance, holds in
his Theory of Global Capitalism that the dynamics that caused the formation
of national capitalist classes, are now unfolding on a transnational scale. After
the hegemonic periods of respectively Holland, Britain and the US, “the baton is
being passed to an emerging transnational configuration” and “we are witness to
an emerging transnational hegemony in a process that is contested and far from
finished, the emergence of a new historic block that is global in scope and based
on the hegemony of transnational capital” (Robinson, 2004, pp. 77). Robinson
expects that the main contradictions that emerge in the process of globalization
will be between the nationally oriented bourgeoisie and the elites that have an
interest beyond the nation states boundaries.
Unfortunately, much of the literature on the emergence of a transnational
capitalist class drew on a mixture of anecdotal evidence and theoretically informed
speculation, as is rightly pointed out by (Burris and Staples, 2012, pp. 324).
Notable exceptions exist however. Fennema (1982), for instance, was the first to
empirically analyze the transnational network of interlocking directorates directors
that sit on the boards of two companies and thus form a connection between the
two firms. He found that by 1970 there was an Atlantic component of interlocking
directorates, which had national clusters connected by international interlocks. By
1976 this network had become much more transnational; the number of interna-
tional interlocks in the Atlantic component had increased by 50 percent. However,
the transnational network of board interlocks was primarily established between
neighboring countries in Europe, crossed to a lesser extent the Atlantic, and hardly
connected upcoming economic regions in Asia or the rest of the world (Fennema,
1982). Board interlocks proved a helpful element in the empirical studies on social
corporate elite organization. Scholars have argued that board interlocks serve
to reduce economic uncertainty and secure resources from banks and suppliers.
Others see them as a mean to maintain class cohesion (Mills, 1956; Zeitlin, 1974),
integrate new elites and facilitate class-wide political action (Domhoff, 1970).
Other perspectives hold that board interlocks together form a communication
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system and provide a ‘business scan’ (Useem, 1984) allowing for the spread of
business strategies and information about (future) economic trends and challenges
(see Davis and Greve (1997), or Mizruchi (1996) for a review). Of course, we should
not reduce the entire (transnational) corporate elite community (and its various
sources of integration) to the practice of interlocking corporate directorships. For
sure, there are many key actors in the business community outside the set of
corporate board members, such as lawyers, accountants, but also fund managers
and perhaps even regulators. Yet, whatever their purpose, board interlocks are
present in practically every country and, as such, are studied being a meaningful
indicator of elite social organization (David and Westerhuis, 2014; Scott, 1991).
Most empirical work on business elite networks in the twentieth century looked
exclusively at connections within particular countries. The transnational corporate
elite was debated and theorized, but, aside from the work of Fennema (1982) and
Fennema and Schijf (1985), empirical research remained scarce. In the twenty-
first century, however, increased attention was paid to the transnational network.
A follow up study on the pioneering work of Fennema (1982) by Carroll and
Fennema (2002) on the transnational network found that twenty years after 1976,
the transnational network of interlocking directorates remained remarkably stable.
Although it was coined the age of globalization, by the mid-1990s the network
of transnational corporate elites still comprised mainly corporate directors and
executives from the leading capitalist countries in North America and Europe
(see also Kentor and Jang (2004)). In the early years of the twenty-first century,
things start to change. By the mid-2000s the top of the transnational network also
connected to elites in countries such as India, Mexico, Singapore, Turkey, Brazil
and China, leading (Carroll et al., 2010a, pp. 233) to conclude that a transnational
capitalist class was “in the making, but not (yet) made”. Most recent empirical
work underscores the resilience of the transnational network in the wake of the
decline of national network cohesion and point at the increasing relevance of these
transnational ties (Heemskerk et al., 2016). A transnational corporate elite may
have finally arrived.
A consistent but often overlooked finding is that the increase in transnational
corporate networks typically does not connect far away regions in the world, but
rather integrates business elites that are relatively nearby, such as in Europe, or
North America (Carroll et al., 2010a,b; Fennema and Schijf, 1985) And this may
have important repercussions for those who expect a transnational corporate elite
identity to emerge. After all it is fair to say that a board interlock between a
German and a Dutch, an USA and a Canadian, or a Venezuelan and a Colombian
firm is qualitatively different from ties that span different regions of the globe,
and connect for instance firms in the USA with China, Spain with India, or
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Italy with Brazil. This begs the question whether these nearby ties, although they
connect the boards of firms domiciled in different countries, are indeed the building
blocks of global elite networks. This question is part of the more general problem
of theoretical and methodological nationalism. Theoretically, ‘transnational’ is
always defined in relation to the ‘national’. Empirically, we often only have data
available that allows us to study and compare network patterns between countries.
If our theoretical concepts are based on countries, and our empirical data is
organized in countries, it may come as no surprise that we find that countries
are important. For the literature on corporate elites this distinction in national
and international has led to the search for elite networks that stand free from
national business communities as a hallmark sign for the transnational corporate
elite. But by assuming that global corporate elites emerge when they transcend
national borders, one fails to acknowledge that corporate elite networks are often
delineated by boundaries that not necessarily coincide with that of the nation
state. Historical, cultural, geographical and political factors determine how and
where the global corporate elites are organizing and whether the nation state is a
meaningful spatial category to depart from. We should therefore make an effort
to develop theoretical and empirical approaches that leave behind the a priori
focus on the nation state as the most relevant spatial category for corporate elite
organization.
2 Local and nonlocal corporate elite networks
2.1 The reorganization of the local
In order to accommodate our effort to come up with an approach that does not
container corporate networks a priori within the boundaries of the nation state,
we turn to Kono et al. (1998), who introduced the useful distinction between
local and nonlocal ties. This distinction is helpful because it allows the analysis of
the structure of networks of interlocking directorates without presupposing that
the nation state is the most important level of elite organization. The dominant
approach in the contemporary literature is to think about national corporate elite
networks as the local, and consider transnational ties that cross national borders
as the nonlocal. But the increase in corporate elite network cohesion across Europe
mentioned above points at alternative reading: it may well be the case that what
is local for corporate elites is what is changing. And this would not be the first
time either. From detailed country studies, we know that in the first half of the
twentieth century, corporate elites where typically organized around cities (Dooley,
1969; Levine, 1972; Allen, 1978). In the USA, the Boston banking elite was different
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from the one in New York (Pak, 2013; Mizruchi, 2013) Even in a small country
as the Netherlands, the pre-World War II corporate elite was organized in the
distinct elite communities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague (with ties to
the Dutch colonies) and the textile industry around Enschede (Heemskerk, 2007).
There is ample evidence of how these local elites organized their cohesion through
upper class social interactions.
Drawing on urban growth machine theory of Molotch (1976), Kono et al. (1998)
argue that well into the twentieth century, the growth and business opportunities of
most firms were predominantly a local affair, which required effective coordination
by public and private actors within cities. To achieve this, corporate elites and
state officials knit together in local growth coalitions in order to shape public
policy that fosters local growth and as such advance their interests. If successful,
some of the larger firms were able to expand their activities beyond the local
growth coalition. This led to nonlocal ties between cities; sometimes in the same
country, sometimes crossing national borders as well. According to Kono et al.
(1998), local ties and nonlocal ties are differently motivated and established by
different sorts of firms. Firms that depend on local growth interlock primarily
with local firms. Conversely, firms with suppliers and production outside the local
region are more likely to interlock with geographically more distant firms.
This organization of elite cohesion at the local city level changed over the
course of the twentieth century when corporate elites gradually integrated with
other established networks within the boundaries of the nation state. In the second
half of the twentieth century we see how these separate local elite communities
that were primarily centered around particular cities, gradually merge together in
national corporate elites. This transformation is perhaps best exemplified in the
mergers of banks that used to serve the interest of regional business communities
and in the emergence of national networks of interlocking directorates (Heemskerk,
2007; Mizruchi, 2013; David and Westerhuis, 2014). What was considered as local
for the business elite changed, and with it their networks changed as well. By the
last quarter of the twentieth century, social organization of corporate elites at the
local level meant in most areas in the world social organization at the national
level.
And with the change of the local, the nonlocal changed as well. The oil crisis
in the 1970s prompted the now national corporate elites to invest in new nonlocal
(and hence transnational) ties with corporations outside of their national business
communities (as pointed about above). And in line with the expectations of Kono
et al. (1998), firms that engaged in these nonlocal transnational interlocking were
typically production firms with a global reach, such as the globally operating oil
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companies (Shell, BP, Gulf Oil and Imperial Oil), car producers (Ford, FIAT,
General Motors) and steel firms (Rio Tinto, British Steel) (Heemskerk et al.,
2016).
The local, thus, varies in scope over time and space. In this article, we do not
hold a predefined conception of what is local and what is nonlocal, as we accept
that what is local may differ across various areas of the world. That business
communities knit together and reconfigure the local in one place, does not mean
that the same processes are taking place elsewhere. That some subnational business
communities transformed into national business communities does not mean that
all business communities became national in scope, nor that this transformation
always took place along national borders. Consequently, we maintain that what is
local is to be inferred from the empirical, rather than forced upon the empirical.
2.2 What is local in a globalized world?
There are good reasons to expect that for the contemporary corporate elite, again
a reconfiguration of the local is taking place in many areas in the world. At least
three empirical observations point into this direction. First, as mentioned above,
the increase in transnational board interlocks in the twenty-first century (Carroll
and Fennema, 2002; Kentor and Jang, 2004). Here it is important to mention that
transnational interlocking predominantly takes place within certain regions such as
Europe and North America. Second, while transnational board interlocks used to
be created by a small elite group of corporate directors, it has now become much
more common practice among corporate elites. A study of the European network of
board interlocks in 2005 and 2010 showed that the hard core of European corporate
directors who created at least four Pan-European interlocks remains stable in
size (resp. 16 and 17 directors), but their contributions to the overall network
density drops from 46 percent in 2005 to 25 percent by 2010 (Heemskerk et al.,
2013, pp. 92). In similar vein, for the global network of board interlocks between
a group of top 176 global firms we see that the contributions of the big linkers (at
least four positions) drops from 31% in 1976 to 20% in 2006 and 12% by 2013.
The role of single linkers, directors with two positions, increases at the same time
from 45% in 1976 to 57% by 2013 (Heemskerk et al., 2016, pp. 78). This suggests
that it becomes more common for corporate directors to engage in transnational
board interlocks, and that the transnational network is no longer the domain of a
few super connectors. Third, a recent study of the global network of interlocking
directorates among the largest one million firms in the world showed that although
we see increasing density of the European corporate network over the past decades,
the underlying network structure remains in fact very regionalized. Because this
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study was not restricted to the top 300 or 500 largest firms it provided a much
more fine-grained perspective on the social structure of Europe’s corporate elite.
Where Carroll and Fennema (2002) concluded that by 1996 the transnational
corporate elite network was still best described as a superstructure that rested
upon rather resilient national bases, (Heemskerk and Takes, 2016, pp. 112) find
a “multilevel structure where, in between the national and the transnational,
discernible regional clusters play a fundamental role in the network architecture”.
In what follows we study the patterns of local and nonlocal corporate elite
organization. In today’s world, what is considered local may very well cross national
borders. And conversely, there may be nonlocal ties within one country as well.
Imagine emerging markets, where some parts of the business elite try to integrate
with the western elites and others are more oriented to their respective states.
The truly global part of the corporate elite network is that which connects across
business communities, disregarding its geographic position or scope. This raises
the question of how to distinguish between local and nonlocal ties, without using
a geographic definition such as national vs. international. In what follows we use
a network analysis approach of community detection as a means of locating local
and nonlocal ties based on the properties of the network structure itself.
3 A large-scale network analytic approach to spatial elite
organization
3.1 Community detection
From a network perspective, communities are groups of nodes that share more
connections with each other than with others outside the community. Communities
are dense interconnected pockets of a network, where its members have a high
degree of interconnectedness. We can define local ties as the set of ties that connect
nodes that are all a member of the same community. Local ties are intra-community
ties, regardless of whether this community is bounded by subnational, national or
regional boundaries. And in similar vein, ties that connect points across different
communities can be designated as nonlocal ties. Following this approach of local
and nonlocal we do not assume that geographic distance or political dividing
lines such as national borders are crucial for the formation of communities. But
at the same time we do not preclude it either. This approach allows us to make
the extent to which the corporate elite is organized along national borders an
empirical question. It also allows for diversity in the (multi-level) organization of
corporate elites from place to place. The local business community may at some
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places be a network centered around a particular city, whereas in other regions
it is centered around a country or a transnational region. Hence, we reveal the
geographic organization of the global corporate elite, and to do so we do not start
with a geographically informed notion of local and nonlocal.
Previous studies typically focused on the networks of board interlocks between
a few hundred of the largest corporations. Here we take a different approach
and study a database that covers millions of firms across the globe. The benefit
of this approach is that it releases us from the need to look at the most likely
places of elite integration, and actually study the entire universe of interlocking
directorates. In our analysis we study the network of board interlocks between
a set of over 5 million connected firms across the globe. As we are interested in
the geographic organization of the corporate elite, we consider the city locations
of the head offices of all firms. This allows us to study how these locations are
clustered in communities and which cities play a more or less important role in the
creation of the nonlocal network ties. Yet, studying this number of board interlocks
without delimiting our sample to a predetermined subset of firms also raises a
question on whether all ties under study can be considered as elite-ties. A board
interlock between two large firms whose operations span the globe supposedly
serves different purposes than a tie between two small private firms connecting two
nearby cities. From a global perspective, the latter tie can hardly be regarded an
elite tie, while at a lower level of analysis the tie may still reinvigorate local growth
coalitions. Rather than identifying the different characteristics of various corporate
elite ties, our effort consists of an attempt to geographically locate the ties that
span current local growth coalitions and are therefor most likely to accommodate
global or regional elite integration. Since this is the first time the global network
of board interlocks has been studied in this scope we first describe and analyze
its overall structure before we distill pattern of communities. Subsequently we
investigate which cities are central in spanning the networks within and between
communities.
3.2 Methods
To better understand our board interlock network, we use social network analysis
techniques. First, we are interested in finding communities, a process commonly
referred to as community detection. We choose to do so using modularity max-
imization. Modularity is a measure that indicates the quality of a division of
the entire network into non-overlapping communities. A higher modularity value
means that over the entire network, there are more connections between nodes
in the same cluster than between nodes in different communities. Because the
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problem of finding the best division of a network into communities is NP-complete,
community detection algorithms try to maximize the modularity value using
heuristics and approximations. We use the common Louvain method (Blondel
et al., 2008). To assess the stability of the communities we find, we compared the
results with some other modularity maximization algorithms that maximize the
value using randomized methods. We observed no notable differences, apart from
small artifacts of randomization.
Second, centrality measures allow nodes to be ranked based on their structural
position in the network. We use degree, eccentricity and betweenness centrality.
The degree centrality measure determines for each node a centrality value based
on the degree (number of connections) of that node, where a node with a higher
number of connections is assumed to be more central. Degree centrality only
considers the local neighborhood of a city as it counts the number of direct
connections. It does not consider how a city is positioned in the network at large,
for instance if it is in the core or in the periphery of the network. For this we
turn to the second centrality measure, eccentricity. For each node in a network,
eccentricity considers the shortest paths to all other nodes in that network. The
longest of such paths gives the eccentricity score. For example, city that has an
eccentricity of five can reach all other cities in at most five steps (Takes and
Kosters, 2013). Third, betweenness centrality considers a node to be more central
if it is part of a relatively larger number of shortest paths between all other node
pairs, i.e. if it is a bridge between communities (Brandes, 2008).
3.3 Data
The data source is the ORBIS database of Bureau van Dijk. This database contains
information on over 200 million private and public companies across the globe.
The ORBIS database has frequently been identified as one of the best sources
of information for research on corporate networks (Vitali et al., 2011; Compston,
2013). At the same time, we need to take into account the limitations of this data
as well. It is sourced from various local information providers (such as national
registers and chambers of commerce), and the quality of the data does differ with a
bias towards better quality for richer countries. An exception to this trend is North
America, whose data quality is moderate. Thus, our results may be downplaying
the role of the United States in the global network For a more elaborate discussion
on the quality of the ORBIS data, see Heemskerk and Takes (2016). Notably, we
do not limit ourselves to listed firms as that would exclude large parts of the
economy. In this we follow common approach in the literature on global corporate
board networks.
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In selecting the firms and directors to construct the board interlock network,
we proceeded as follows. In September 2015, we selected from the database all
firms listed as ‘active’ for which data on positions was available. For each firm,
we acquired data on its positions, selecting only those positions listed as ‘current’
and held by actual persons (and thus not by firms). We only selected positions
listed as being the chief executive officer, highest executive, supervisory board,
executive board, board of directors or member of a committee. This results in a
set of 18,211,838 firms where 8,090,796 senior level directors hold positions such
that an interlock is created between two firms. The cities of these firms are divided
over countries as shown in Figure 1.
An increasingly important problem when studying board interlock networks
has to do with rise in complex administrative holding structures that firms create
for fiscal and legal purposes. In the myriad of legal entities that together constitute
a firm or bank, it becomes very difficult to pinpoint what the proper delineation of
the firm is, and which board we should consider in our analysis. Shell companies
and brass plate companies in tax havens only add to this confusion. As a result,
there is a fair share of board interlocks in the network that are administrative ties
that exist on paper only, rather than social ties where people actually meet and
participate in meaningful board conversation and decision making. It is difficult
to filter out these different types of ties (Heemskerk and Takes, 2016). Here we
have chosen a practical and effective approach to diminish the distorting effect
of administrative ties. We eliminate the interlock ties that go hand in hand with
an ownership relation of more than 50% (as registered in ORBIS), as this is then
likely a parent-subsidiary or holding structure. Similarly, we ignored directors
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Figure 1: Division of cities over countries
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with more than 100 positions, because it is unlikely that such a person facilitates
‘real’ interlocks.
The information on board positions is essentially a two-mode network of firms
and officers linked through positions. From this we constructed a one-mode network
in which the nodes represent firms and weighted edges represent shared senior level
directors. The edge weight denotes the number of shared directors between the two
firms the edge connects. In this firm-by-firm network, not all firms are connected
to each other. In particular, the network contains multiple connected components.
As is typical for these networks, there is one giant component. These 5,262,534
firms capture the majority of the interlocks. The second largest component in
terms of size contains only 339 firms, and in fact 95% of the smaller components
are of size smaller than 20. The majority of economic activity is captured by the
giant component, and for the remainder of this paper we will therefore focus on
this component.
So, we end up with a network of over 5.2 million firms that are connected
by about 37 million board interlocks (the largest connected component in the
network). For our analysis we consider the board interlocks between cities. To
do so, we aggregate all firms that are domiciled in the same city in one node,
and connect city nodes by means of a weighted edge indicating the number of
interlocks between firms in these cities. Appendix A gives detailed information on
how we aggregated the firms in city clusters.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Network topology
We study the network of 24,747 cities, connected through 874,810 distinct ties
(which together carry the 37 million board interlocks). Because the network is an
aggregation of the connected component of the underlying firm-by-firm network, all
cities are connected in one component as well. On average, each city is connected to
71 other cities. However, as displayed by Figure 2, there is a significant difference
in the degree of connectivity of cities. A sizable group of cities have board interlock
connections to no more than ten other cities, while a relatively small number
of cities are super connectors, reaching out to over a 1,000 other cities. This
power-law distribution signals the scale-free property of the network.
How globally connected is the corporate elite? The average distance measures
the average number of steps to be traversed to get from one node to another
11
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Figure 2: Degree distribution of the city network
node. It turns out that cities in the global network of interlocking directorates
are interconnected with an average distance of only 2.83. The distribution of
average distances shown in Figure 3 indicates that the global city network is
relatively well connected through interlocking directorates; it is indeed a small-
world network (Kleinberg, 2000).
A next step is to consider those cities that are most central in this global
city network. Table 1 shows the distribution of the eccentricity values. On the
rightmost end of the eccentricity spectrum there are the cities that are least well
connected. The largest eccentricity score is 7, meaning that those cities are 7 steps
away of at least one other city in the network. We can say these cities form the
periphery. There are only 37 nodes in this periphery, which upon manual inspection
appears to mainly consist of smaller businesses in rural areas of Russia and the
United States. More interesting in Table 1 is the lowest value of eccentricity in the
network. This value is called the radius, and the set of nodes with an eccentricity
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Figure 3: Distance distribution of the city network
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Table 1: Eccentricity distribution of the city network
Eccentricity value 4 5 6 7
Frequency 409 20782 3519 37
value equal to this this radius are in the center of the network. The cities in the
center of the network have an eccentricity of 4, meaning that they can reach all
other cities in at most four steps. This group consists of 409 cities: 1.65% of the
nodes in the city network.
Figure 4 shows the network between this set of central cities. For visibility
reasons, we have chosen to only show edges when two cities are connected by more
than 20 board interlocks. One observation clearly stands out: London is right in
the center of this group of central cities. It is the most central city in the global
board interlock network by both degree and betweenness measures (see Table 2).
It is followed by high degree centrality cities Paris, Madrid, Brussels, Milano,
Luxembourg and Barcelona. Sao Paulo and Moscow score among the top five
cities ranked by betweenness centrality, since they connect their emerging markets
Figure 4: Visualization of the center (eccentricity value 4) of the city network
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Table 2: Top-25 most central cities in the city network
Degree centrality Betweenness centrality
London London
Paris Sao Paulo
Madrid Paris
Bruxelles Madrid
Milano Moscow
Luxembourg Melbourne
Barcelona Sydney
Wien Bruxelles
Amsterdam Wien
Dublin Barcelona
Oslo Helsinki
Helsinki Milano
Sydney Oslo
Zurich Bogota
Kobenhavn Luxembourg
Melbourne Rio De Janeiro
Hamburg New Delhi
Auckland Budapest
Stockholm Auckland
Zug Amsterdam
Berlin Sofia
Muenchen Washington
New Delhi Praha
Frankfurt Stockholm
Praha Bucureshti
to the global corporate network. Cities in the United Kingdom are well connected
as well, not only to other UK cities but also abroad. In fact, UK cities connect
more to cities abroad than within the UK. This effect is largely driven by London,
which is extraordinary well connected. This overrepresentation of international
city ties is typically a feature of small countries where businesses are concentrated
in a few cities, such as Belgium, Switzerland and Austria. A final observation is
that although there is a fair share of USA cities in this central core, they form
somewhat of a peripheral cluster, primarily connected to the rest of the world
through New York, Washington and Los Angeles. However, low data quality in
the USA may downplay its role in the global network (Section 3.2).
4.2 Local communities in the global corporate elite
Now we turn to the key objective of this paper and distinguish between local
and nonlocal network ties. As explained above, we use the method of community
detection and define the ties within communities as local, and those between
communities as nonlocal. When we apply the Louvain modularity maximization
14
method for community detection at the default resolution, all cities in the network
are grouped in 14 separate communities. This division in communities has a
modularity value of 0.83. Previous work has studied in depth how the community
structure of global networks of interlocks is hierarchically nested (Heemskerk
and Takes, 2016). Here we choose to study the division in communities that
generates the highest modularity value, that is, the partitioning in communities
that optimizes the rule that nodes are better connected within a community than
between communities.
A fair share of the board interlocks occurs between firms within cities. This
means that in the network, there are self-loops which ‘connect’ cities with them-
selves. Some of these self-loops have considerable weight. If we include these
self-loops when applying community detection, the communities we find are
slightly biased towards different countries’ capitals, and fewer communities appear.
London has an extraordinary strong self-loop. If self-loops are taken into account
when applying community detection, London is considered as a separate commu-
nity. Without the integrative power of London the rest of the British business
community falls apart in 19 separate additional communities.
The cities in the UK in general and London in particular stand out in this re-
spect. From the analysis with self-loops one can cautiously infer that the corporate
communities are more sub-nationally structured than along national boundaries.
Here we choose to exclude the self-loops for the community detection analysis
because the large increase in communities makes our analysis of inter-community
ties more difficult to interpret. Because of the hierarchically nested community
structure, we do not throw away information but rather analyze the network
at a higher level of aggregation. Figure 5 illustrates this by comparing how the
communities with and without self-loops are hierarchically nested. The most
leftward column shows for instance that the 20 separate British communities that
are generated with self loops are all part of the British community in the analysis
without self-loops.
Figure 6 gives a representation of the spatial distribution of the community
structure. The nodes are cities, positioned in space based on their longitude and
latitude. Cities in the same community have the same color. There are a number of
observations. First of all, we see that this color-coding of the communities clearly
highlights particular countries. Portugal is clearly separated from Spain on the
Iberian Peninsula (but in the same community as Brazil), the United Kingdom
(and Ireland) stands out, as do South Africa and Finland. Note that the community
detection algorithm only considered board interlocks between firms in cities and
did not have any information on nationality. Nonetheless, the results show that
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Figure 5: Nested structure of communities with and without city self-loops
national borders do still play a role for the organization of business elites. Second,
at the same time there are communities that bring together firms and cities from
neighboring regions and countries. In Europe we see a southwestern and a central
European community, and in Asia there are two communities as well. A closer look
reveals that countries from the former British Empire are still relatively close and
therefore grouped in one community: India, Australia and New Zealand. South
Korea and Vietnam also belong to this group.
Figure 7 zooms in on Europe and gives a more detailed insight in the spatial
level of corporate elite organization. The European corporate network clearly
separates in distinct regional communities, but a visual inspection already shows
that national borders still play an important role. Interestingly, some of the
communities reflect geo-political structures now long gone. One business community
follows the boundaries of Czechoslovakia; another resembles the original early
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Figure 6: Community structure of the global network of interlocking directorates
Figure 7: Community structure of the European part of the network
nineteenth century Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg). Among the Nordic countries, Finland separates from Scandinavia.
Another interesting observation is that Poland is very divided. Poland seems to
lack a cohesive business community as the German (or Central European) business
community permeates Poland within the nineteenth century German and Prussian
borders. These observations suggest that the level of cohesion among business
elites differs significantly across Europe.
For each community we can zoom in on the nationality of the cities that are
part of the clusters (see Figure 8). The smallest communities are the ones around
South Africa, the Czech and Slovak republics, and The Netherlands and Belgium.
The Russian corporate elite is organized in a separate community, and Russian
cities are absent from the other communities (with only a handful exceptions).
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Figure 8: National diversity of community composition
This is in line with the high betweenness centrality of Moscow, reported above.
Moscow connects the distinct Russian community to the rest of the world.
Bulgarian and Romanian corporate elites dominate a South East European
community, that extends south to regions in Turkey, Greece and Egypt. China
and Japan together dominate the East Asian community, while Australia and
India are the dominant countries in the more diverse and larger Asian community.
This community also includes a number of North American as well as European
cities. In Northern Europe, the Baltic countries are divided over the Scandinavian
community (Latvia and Lithuania) and a Finnish one (Estonia). The latter reflects
the deep cultural and language similarities. In a way the UK-USA cluster may
reflect language and cultural similarities as well, although within the USA there
is a division between locations oriented on the Anglo-American community; the
Commonwealth Asian community, and a North American community. This North
American community includes Israel as well, reflecting long standing political
and social ties. Language similarity is also evident in the Brazilian-Portuguese
community. Finally, there are two very large and internationally diverse com-
munities in Europe. One is centered around Germany and extends south to the
Alpine countries and east to Hungary, Croatia and parts of Poland. The largest
community contains the business elites of the largest Southern European countries
on the continent: Spain, France, and Italy.
Reviewing the national composition of the communities, we need to conclude
that there is considerable diversity. Some communities single out a particular
business elite, such as the Russian one. Some bring together business elites from
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culturally similar regions, such as the transatlantic community; Scandinavia, and
Portugal-Brazil. Other communities however are more diverse in its composition
and suggest a level of corporate elite organization that goes across national borders.
4.3 The nonlocal network ties
The lion share of the board interlocks connect firms and cities that fall within the
same community. If we only consider the binary network where cities are either
connected or disconnected, 67 percent of all the connections are local and 33 percent
nonlocal. If we count all board interlocks between cities (the weighted network),
an impressive 92 percent of the network resides within the communities. Note that
this is also reflected by the high modularity value. At the same time, the 8% of
nonlocal ties contain no less than 2.84 million board interlocks. These nonlocal
interlocks connect the communities, and Figure 9 shows what the global network
looks like if we aggregate to the level of communities. To ease the interpretation,
the position of the nodes is related to their geographic position vis--vis each other.
As we can expect, the network is fully connected. But some communities are
better connected than others, as reflected by the thickness of the tie in Figure 9.
The strongest tie connects South West Europe with Central Europe. This is,
AngloAmerica
PortugalBrazil
South-WestEurope
Russia
CommonwealthAsia
Lowcountries
CentralEurope
FinlandScandinavia
SouthEastEurope
NorthAmerica
Czecoslovakia
EastAsia
SouthAfrica
Figure 9: Community by community network
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indeed, the German-Franco axis that is so fundamental to the process of European
integration. At the same time, there still is a clear separation between a French
and German corporate sphere of influence. One may say that when the time comes
that the German and French business elites are no longer distinct communities
but part of the same community, the project of European Unification has come
to the next level. Both the central and southwestern European communities are
well connected with the Anglo-American community, with London as hub. The
Commonwealth label of one of the communities seems justified given the strong
tie it has with Anglo-America, in fact through the strong ties with London.
We already saw that London plays a key role in connecting business elites
across the globe, and this remains the case when we consider the cities that
are most important in spanning the global network of nonlocal corporate ties.
Figure 10 singles out the network between the most central cities in the network
of nonlocal ties, that is the group of cities that connect to at least 1,000 cities in
other communities. Given the relatively high density of ties in Europe and the
larger number of European communities, it is to be expected to see a large number
of European cities among this hard core. In Europe, the capital cities (Madrid,
Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen and so on) are all part of the
core as the network. We also see that major transportation hubs such as airports
and harbors bring together the transnational corporate elite (Schiphol, Zaventem,
Antwerpen, Rotterdam). Valetta, in south Europe, is the capital city of Malta. In
Asia, it is noticeable that a number of Indian cities are part of the hard core of the
network. Hong Kong singles out as a hub in Asia, reaching out to all other parts
of the network. In Africa, Johannesburg remains well connected with a noticeable
strong tie to London, as many other cities have as well. Interestingly, New York is
the only USA city among this key group in the network in Figure 10. New York is
the bridgehead of the USA to the rest of the world.
5 Conclusion and discussion
We argued that in order to advance our understanding of the organization of
corporate elites, we must not force the distinction between national and transna-
tional upon the analysis. Business elites reconfigure their networks, from the city
level, to the national level, and beyond. Here we asked what is the current level
of organization. In order to develop an answer to this question we studied the
worldwide network of interlocking directorates of over 5 million firms. We did so
without assuming that the main distinction between corporate elites is that of
the national – transnational level. Building on the theoretical distinction between
local and nonlocal ties we used network analysis and in particular community
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Figure 10: Nonlocal network between the main networked cities
detection to understand how corporate elites are organized in distinct business
communities, and where and how these business communities are subsequently
interconnected. Our large-scale network analysis rendered a number of insights.
First of all, national borders still play an important role for the organization
of corporate elites. The community structure we uncovered shows that national
borders still form cleavages for corporate elites. The community structure also
echoes state delineations long gone, such as Czechoslovakia and the original
Kingdom of the Netherlands, and also in part the mixture of communities in
Poland that are partly structured along the old German border. Communities also
reflect language and ethnic connections, for instance between Estonia and Finland
or Portugal and Brazil. Second, we also find that what is local for the business elite
is indeed changing from the national to the transnational plane. However, we see
considerable heterogeneity in the level of elite organization across different regions
in the world. In Russia, the local business community coincides with the state
boundaries. In the USA in contrast we find three spheres of influence: one North
American (including Israel) community, one community oriented towards Asia and
one community oriented towards Europe, most prominently London. In this paper
we only studied a snapshot image of the global network of interlocking directorates.
A longitudinal study with similar setup could trace how these communities develop
over time. In the case of the USA, this would render unique opportunities, for
instance to study if the pivot to Asia in the USA foreign policy is also reflected
in the orientation of the business elite. And, if it does, we can ask whether the
business elite networks foreshadow the foreign policy change or follow its lead.
Third, we found that the city hubs in the networks are very different in nature.
London is the most central city in the network of the global corporate elite. The
status of London within its community and the network as a whole is unmatched
by any other city.
When analyzing trans-community or nonlocal networks, rather than transna-
tional ones, we find that outside Europe, connections are primarily regional in
nature and that the networks do not reach out much to the rest of the world. If the
true ‘global corporate elites’ are the ones that transcend their mostly regionally
structured local business communities, then they can mainly be found in Europe
or in the hubs that are well connected to London (often located in commonwealth
territory). Beside the relatively low representation of North American cities, cities
in China, Japan and Russia do not reach out much outside their local communities
at all. This sheds light on how the transnational or global elite is socially configured
and whether we will indeed witness the emergence of a truly ‘global corporate elite’
or ‘global capitalist class’. Despite claims on increasing interdependence of various
economic regions in the world, corporate elites from Asia, Latin-America and even
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North-America, are not yet fully integrated in the corporate elite network that
transcend local communities.
In sum, it seems warranted to conclude that our approach to study local and
nonlocal corporate elite ties is a fruitful endeavor. We hope that our work shows
that it is important to include space in the study of corporate elites. In studies on
corporate elites, space has long been implicitly considered as a natural stage upon
which social action unfolds Friedland and Palmer (1994). Although there existed
some notions of spatiality in studies of corporate elites (see for instance Dooley
(1969); Levine (1972); Allen (1978); Mizruchi (1982); Mintz and Schwartz (1985)),
geographic proximity of inter-firm relations was mostly regarded to be something
unsocial. Following Friedland and Palmer (1994) and Kono et al. (1998), we prefer
to view space as a socially formed determinant, medium and outcome of social
structure. Our approach shows that it is elementary, possible and helpful to study
space without forcing a certain spatial category such as states upon the analysis.
At the same time, we recognize that our study is limited in a number of ways.
Here we considered board interlocks as a telltale sign of elite organization. In
the introduction we already pointed out that we believe this is an expedient, but
necessarily limited approach for studying corporate elites. For one, it leaves out
key actors outside the boardroom such as lawyers, accountants, but also investors
and fund managers who arguable have an increasing role in todays financialized
capitalism. We therefore do not want to claim that we have now investigated
the corporate elite in its fullest extent. Another limitation is a direct result of
the large scale of our analysis. Although the scale allows us to engage in a fine
grained analysis of worldwide patterns of elite organization, it does so at the
expense of a detailed understanding of its constituting individual components: the
firms and directors. Our analysis is in that sense disconnected from the logics and
interests that drive the formation of the networks that we study at the level of
the actors out of which it is composed. And to make matters more complicated,
we know that these logics and interests differ across different regions in the world.
Board interlocks have a different meaning and function for firms in Asia, Latin
America, or Europe. We do see very promising developments however in the area of
modelling network dynamics (agent based and exponential random graph models)
that may make it possible in the near future to comparatively study the generating
mechanisms of board interlocks in the different communities that we uncovered.
Finally, the large scale also means that we cannot be as confident about the quality
of our data as we can when we manually collect samples. For instance, the low
weight of the USA in the network may be due to lower data quality (3.2). This
is an important concern, and with the increase of large scale corporate network
studies we must devote more attention towards the development of tools and
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techniques to gauge and improve data quality.
An important benefit from our approach is that it allows for, and indeed
uncovered, different levels of elite organization in different areas of the world. The
community detection approach also allows for more fine grained and detailed stud-
ies, in at least two ways. First, we can continue and investigate the particularities
of the network structure within communities. How are the different communi-
ties in their topological properties? And how does this relate to our theoretical
understanding of elite formation in these regions? Second, as explained in the
methods section, we can further dissect the community structure and investigate
the hierarchically nested structure. We now have the data available, necessary
to conduct such fine grained analysis. We see this as a promising way forward
for understanding the multilevel structure of elite organization as pointed out
in Heemskerk and Takes (2016). This brings us to a final and related shortcoming
of our study. We argue against the national–international dichotomy in the study
of corporate elites. And while our approach breaks free from theoretical and
methodological nationalism, our suggested dichotomy of local and nonlocal leaves
only little room for a proper analysis of the multi-level structure we encountered.
Follow up work must make an effort to develop a more multi-level or nested
approach of social organization of corporate elites.
We believe our approach also presents a promising avenue for developing an
answer to a key question in global politics, international relations, and economic
sociology today: do we see a relatively cohesive transnational corporate power
elite or are there in fact factions with irreconcilable differences among such a
transnational corporate elite? The distinction between local and nonlocal corporate
elite networks allows us to reinvigorate the classic debate on elite power between
elitists and pluralists at the global plane. Elitist scholars from the power structure
research school already pointed out that the question is mainly a matter of local
and nonlocal elite organization. Both Mills (1956) and Domhoff (1967) noted that,
whereas at the local level there was room for competition between elites as pointed
out in Price and Dahl (1962), the institutions that transcended the local level
were dominated by a small number of people of a clearly discernible upper class.
This suggests a research agenda where we investigate in depth the characteristics,
motives and strategies of the firms, directors, and perhaps also cities that build
the nonlocal elite networks.
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A City level aggregation
As explained in Section 3.2, we study the network of interlocking directorates at
the level of cities. However, if we simply merge firms from the same city into one
node in order to create a city-by-city network, we run into a number of problems
due to the noise and inconsistencies in the city information. For example, we
would have to deal with spelling variations of city names, e.g., The Hague, the
political capital of the Netherlands, is sometimes written as ’s-Gravenhage. And
for example Brussels, the capital of Belgium, is also written as Bruxelles (French)
and sometimes as Brussel (Dutch). More importantly, small suburban areas close
to a larger city may have a different name, but would by any expert be seen as
belonging to the same metropolitan area. However, due to the sheer amount of
information we are not able to manually correct this.
The aforementioned problems are solved by retrieving for each city its coordi-
nates (latitude and longitude) using the Google Maps API, and then grouping
cities with very similar coordinates into one node which we call a citycluster.
We used the well-known and established MeanShift algorithm (Fukunaga and
Hostetler, 1975) as implemented in the sklearn package in Python to cluster the
cities. For one out of ten of the cities, we only had information on the country
in which the firm is located, or we were not able to automatically determine
the latitude and longitude, leaving us no choice but to disregard these firms in
our study. The majority (90%) of these firms with missing location data were
however located in Panama, leaving only 1% missing data for the remainder of the
world. Typically, these firms were smaller businesses in rural areas, having mostly
national interlocks, if any. These steps result in a citycluster-by-citycluster network
in which cityclusters are connected by a weighted edge denoting the number of
firms that are connected between two clusters. In some cityclusters we find cities
from a border region of two different countries. In these instances, we split the
original citycluster into two cityclusters, each containing the cities on one side of
the border. In the text, we simply refer to cities instead of cityclusters.
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